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Abstract

This thesis proposes a secure authentication protocol against physical session
hijacking attacks. In client/server technology, users establish sessions to access the
services offered by the servers. However, using physical session hijacking attacks,
malicious users may physically take control of ongoing sessions. Malicious users
also can establish sessions with servers using stolen passwords. In both cases, the
server will be communicating with the wrong user who pretends to be the real user.

The goal of this authentication protocol is to continuously and dynamically
ensure that during an ongoing session the current session‟s user is himself the real
person that is known to the server. The proposed continuous and dynamic
verification process is based on the use of the session user‟s biometrics data. The
proposed protocol uses the 40-byte Option field in the IP header to continuously and
dynamically verify the session user‟s biometrics. Since the biometrics data is
potentially large in size, only random portion of biometrics data is used for
authentication and is embed in the IP Option field. In this thesis, the focus is only on
fingerprint and Iris biometrics data. The use of the IP Option field to embed the
biometrics data will ensure that the proposed protocol is compatible with the current
TCP/IP stack implementation. This would allow to not creating a new protocol or
making major modification to the current TCP/IP stack implementation. This
protocol has been simulated using Matlab to evaluate its performance. In addition,
the authenticity and secrecy of the proposed protocol has been validated using
Scyther tool.

Keywords: Physical session hacking attacks, Biometrics, IP header Option Field,
Iris, Fingerprint, User authentication.
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)Title and Abstract (in Arabic

بروتوكول المصادقة الذيناميكية للخذمات اآلمنة المعتمذ على القياسات الحيوية
الملخص

حقخشح ْزِ األطشٔحت بشٔحٕكٕل يصادقت آيٍ ضذ ْجًاث االخخطاف انًادٌت نجهساث
االحصال .فً حقٍُت انخادو/انًسخخذو  ،نهًسخخذيٍٍ إَشاء جهساث احصال نهٕصٕل إنى انخذياث
انخً حقذيٓا انخٕادؤ .يع رنك ،قذ ٌسخطٍع انًسخخذو انخبٍث انخحكى بجهساث االحصال انقائًت
باسخخذاو ْجًاث االخخطاف انًادٌت نٓزِ انجهساث  .انًسخخذو انخبٍث أٌضا قذ ٌسخطٍع اَشاء
جهست احصال يع انخادو باسخخذاو كهًت يشٔس يسشٔقت .فً كهخا انحانخٍٍ ،انخادو سٕف ٌخصم
يع انًسخخذو انخاطئ انزي ٌخظاْش بأَّ ْٕ انًسخخذو انحقٍقً.
انٓذف يٍ ْزا انبشٔحٕكٕل ْٕ انحصٕل عهى يصادقت يسخًشة ٔ دٌُايٍكٍت خالل
جهساث االحصال انقائًت ٔ انخأكذ بأٌ انًسخخذو انحانً ْٕ فعال انًسخخذو انًعشٔف نهخادو.
انعًهٍت انًسخًشة ٔ انذٌُايٍكٍت انًقخشحت نهخحقق حسخُذ إنى انبٍاَاث انحٌٍٕت نهًسخخذو.
انبشٔحٕكٕل انًقخشح سٕف ٌسخخذو  04باٌج يٍ انًساحت انًخٕفشة فً (ٔ )IP option field
ًْ جزء يٍ يقذيت طبقت  )IP header( IPنهخحقق بشكم يسخًش ٔ دٌُايٍكً يٍ انبٍاَاث
انحٌٍٕت نهًسخخذو .ألٌ انبٍاَاث انحٌٍٕت نهًسخخذو حكٌٕ كبٍشة فً انحجى عادة ،فإٌ جزءا بسٍطا
يخخاسا بشكم عشٕائً يُٓا سٕف ٌسخخذو فً عًهٍت انًصادقت ٔ سٕف ٌخى حضًٍُّ فً ( IP
 .)Option Fieldفً ْزِ األطشٔحت ،سٍخى انخشكٍز عهى َٕعٍٍ يٍ انبٍاَاث انحٌٍٕت ٔ ًْا
بصًت انٍذ ٔ قزحٍت انعٍٍ .إٌ اسخخذاو انًساحت انًخاحت يٍ ( )IP option fieldفً عًهٍت
حضًٍٍ انبٍاَاث انحٌٍٕت سٕف ٌضًٍ أٌ انبشٔحٕكٕل انًقخشح سٍكٌٕ يٕائًا نبشٔحٕكٕل
االَخشَج انقائى انًسًى ْ .TCP/IPزا انخضًٍٍ سٕف ٌضًٍ عذو انحاجت ألي حطٌٕش أٔ
حعذٌم فً يكذساث االَخشَج انحانٍت (ْ .)TCP/IP stackزا انبشٔحٕكٕل حى يحاكاحّ فً ْزِ
األطشٔحت باسخخذاو بشَايج ( )Matlabنهخأكذ يٍ كفائخّ .باإلضافت إنى رنك ،فقذ حًج عًهٍت
انخحقق يٍ صحت ٔ سشٌت انبشٔحٕكٕل باسخخذاو بشَايج (.)Scyther

مفاهيم البحث الرئيسيةْ :جًاث االخخطاف انًادٌت نجهساث االحصال ،انبٍاَاث انحٌٍٕت ،يجال
 ،IP option Fieldقزحٍت انعٍٍ ،بصًت انٍذ ،يصادقت انًسخخذو
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Nowadays, secure services are greatly needed to protect institutions‟ sensitive
information. Secure services need to embody the requirements of information
security, namely confidentiality (information is not disclosed to unauthorized
person), integrity (accuracy and completeness of the transferred information),
availability (information should serve its purpose and available when needed),
authentication (ensuring that the communication agent is the one that it claims to be)
and non-repudiation (proofing that the message is sent by the specified agent and
received as well by the specified agent). The previous definitions are mentioned by
(Stallings and Brown, 2012).
To implement security requirements, systems require secure protocols, such as
Challenge and Response protocols

which is explained by (Stallings, 2003). To

achieve a strong security, these protocols use strong challenges. One of the best
techniques to implement a stronger challenge is biometrics, which refer to the
metrics related to human characteristics. Biometrics are measurable characteristics
that are distinctive and can be used to label, describe or identify the individual. Most
common biometrics that are used for identification are fingerprint, face, Iris, and
DNA. The biometrics are represented in databases as binary values. The smallest part
of biometrics data is known as Template Value. A given biometrics of a single
person consists of a large number of templates.
This thesis main objective is to propose a secure protocol for continuously and
dynamically authenticating both the user‟s computer and the user himself that are
involved in a given established session. The authentication of the computer is assured
by normal cryptographic operations, such as symmetric cryptography and hash
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functions. While the authentication of the user himself is achieved by continuously
and dynamically verifying his/her biometrics data. Hence, the goal of this
authentication protocol is to continuously and dynamically ensure that during an
ongoing session the user himself is the person who is really using the device. In fact,
a malicious user can either physically hijack an ongoing session after the authorized
login takes place, or establish a session using stolen login and password. The
continuous and dynamic verification of the user‟ biometrics by the session‟s server
will allow to authenticate whether or not the current user for an ongoing session is
the right person. If no, the session will be shut down by the server.
On the other hand, nowadays, most of the secure services run over IP
networks. The proposed authentication protocol should be compatible with the
different protocols running over IP networks, and should not require any
modifications of the TCP/IP stack.

To achieve this requirement, the proposed

protocol uses the 40-byte Option field in the IP header to dynamically verify the
session user‟s biometrics. The use of the Option field to embed the biometrics data
will ensure that the proposed protocol is compatible with any IP protocols. This
would allow to not creating a new protocol or making major modification to the
current TCP/IP stack implementation.
The identification of this protocol will be done in the Options field by
identifying a unique number in the sub-field Option Type. This unique number in the
Option Type will be used by the server and client of an ongoing session to identify
that a given packet belongs to the proposed protocol. This protocol has the ability to
authenticate users of different applications types, such as HTTP, FTP and TFTP.
The scope of this proposal is designing a protocol using pre-generated biometrics
digital data for authentications in networks. The biometrics sensing devices
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technology and the extraction methods of the biometrics data are out of this thesis‟s
scope. The determination of the strength or weakness of the used cryptographic
algorithms is out of the scope of this thesis, as well. All used cryptographic
algorithms are assumed to be perfect and secure. The type of encryption used on this
thesis is symmetric cryptography. The key management of the secret is assumed to
be done in earlier stage of the proposed solution.
The organization of the remaining part of the thesis is as following: Chapter-2
presents the background. Chapter-3 discusses related works. Chapter-4 covers the
theory of biometrics and their standard digital representations. Chapter-5 explains the
proposed protocol in details. Chapter-6 explains the conducted simulations and
results. Chapter-7 evaluates the security of the proposed protocol using Scythe tool.
Chapter-8 concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2: Background
2.1 User Authentication
User authentication is the process of verifying and identifying a user to the
system based on claims that are defined by or for the system (Stallings and Brown,
2012). It consists of two steps, identification and verification. Verification is based on

unique identifier of the user only. Identification is presenting and generating
authentication information and compares it with the whole database that contains the
enrolled data of individuals. An enrollment of the identifier should be done in earlier
stage.
The authentication of a user is classified into four main categories:
Something that identity knows (e.g. Password, PIN and Answers to challenge)
Something that identity owns: (e.g. Smart Card and Physical Key)
Something that identity is (static biometrics)
Something that identity does (dynamic biometrics)

Password is widely used for user authentication. The system compares the user‟s
password with the enrolled password in the system database. In current operating
systems, the password is stored as a hash of the original of the password with a salt
value instead of depending on the password value itself. The UNIX password scheme
is shown in Figure-1. The password is vulnerable to some attacks, such as dictionary
attacks, electronic monitoring and popular password attacks (Stallings and Brown,
2012). Roles and policies are set to ensure having secure password.
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Figure 1: UNIX password scheme

Smart card is an example of authentication using user‟s possessions. The
hardware implementation of smart card is shown in Figure-2. There are three
categories of smart card‟s authentication protocols: static, dynamic password
generator and challenge-response. In static, the user authenticates himself to the
token, and then the token authenticate the user to the system. In dynamic password
generator, the token generates a unique password dynamically, and the password is
entered to the computer either manually by the user or electronically via the token. In
the challenge response authentication protocol, the system generates a challenge and
smart card response based on that challenge (e.g. the challenge is encrypted by public
key and the token decrypts it using private key).

6

Figure 2: Smartcard hardware architecture

Biometrics is the science where the person is identified or verified using the
metrics of his biological characteristics.

Biometrics are explained in details in

chapter-4 of this thesis.

2.2 Methodology of designing secure protocols
Designing a secure protocol is a trade-off between three factors: security,
efficiency and scalability. The triangle of secure protocol design is shown in Figure3.

Figure 3: Secure protocol triangle
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The security of the protocol is achieved by the following known information
security requirements:
Confidentiality: (e.g. confidentiality of the transmitted data is achieved by
symmetric encryption)
Integrity: (e.g. integrity of transmitted data is achieved by message
authentication code)
Availability: information should serve its purpose and available when needed
Non-repudiation: (e.g. sending user‟s biometrics will ensure non-repudiation)
Authentication: (e.g. user is verified by his biometrics data)

The efficiency of a secure protocol is a term used to describe the properties
related to the computational resources. The designer of any protocol should optimize
the usage of these computational resources. The efficiency is measured by some
criteria, such as:
Throughput: (e.g. the transmitted data rate per second).
Memory usage: (e.g. The required memory to perform the protocol)
Power consumption: (e.g. the amount of power consumption of each
challenge-response algorithm)
Cost : (e.g. the cost of computers, routers, software to implement the
protocol)
For example, implementing 256-bit encryption will provide more security than
128-bit if the same algorithm is used. However, in the other hand, the memory usage
and power consumption will increase as well.
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The scalability is the ability of the protocol to handle the growing amount of
work. The designer of any protocol should expect that his protocol will be able to
interact with the rapid improvement of security requirements. The scalability is
measured by some criteria, such as:
Compatibility: (e.g. the protocol is compatible with different operating
systems, and the protocol is compatible with any TCP/IP protocol)
Upgradeability: (e.g. the protocol can be upgraded to support any new type
of biometrics authentication that is not supported now).
For example, supporting different operating systems will increase the scalability
of the system, but it will increase the surface of the system which will encourage the
attackers to find vulnerabilities in the system.
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Chapter 3: Related Works
3.1 Enhancing Security by Embedding Biometric Data in IP Header
(Lee, Kim and Yoo, 2007) introduces an IPBio theory. They proposed a solution
to have a continuous authentication of all packets coming from the live sender
(client). They proposed to include a portion of the biometrics data of the client for
per-packet authentication to digest the IP datagram. Their solution is started by initial
exchange of the session key that is used to encrypt the initial biometric data. They
depend on Lamport‟s technique to ensure a secure way of authenticating the client.
After confirmation by the receiver (server), the session key will not be used and a
random portion of the bio-data is used to encrypt the digested value of the packet
payload. A new protocol was created by them (IPPROTO_BIO_KEY) for login
packet session. This requires a modification in the server TCP/IP stack.
After establishing the session, the user opens a TCP connection to the server by
sending (SYN packet) containing his biometrics data (collected at run time)
encrypted with the session key. The server decrypts the bio-data and verifies the data
by comparing it with the pre-registered data in server database. The server then,
saves the current biometric data for this session. An Acknowledgement SYN is sent
by the server if the verification is successful. This Acknowledgement SYN differs
from the normal Acknowledgement SYN because it contains a direction about the
required portion of the biometric data. The client responds with the final ACK, to
complete 3-way handshake. The response contains a portion of bio-data based on the
server direction. The packet format of SYN and ACK is explained in Figure-4. The
portion of bio-data will be used to digest all packets sent by the client during the
session.
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Figure 4: IPBio packet flow
3.2 Biometrics Assisted Secure Network Transactions
(Kunnil, Pillai and Milshtein, 2007) proposed an authentication protocol based on
fingerprint image to generate an authentication key instead of depending on
Password or PINS. The authentication process was done by selecting random areas
from the fingerprint image as a key. An additional layer which is blood vessel map is
used to determine that a live finger is being used.
They propose a trusted third party based approach for providing keys and
timestamps for information exchange as shown in Figure-5. In initial phases; the
biometric reader sends a message to token server and remote server before acquiring
fingerprint data. Then, the remote server generates a CIK (Coordinate Information
Key) which contains index of fingerprint portion stored in the remote server as a key
to the token server. This key is time-stamped by token server and forwarded to the
biometric reader and remote server. Once key is received, the biometrics reader
acquires the fingerprint image and blood vessel. After that, the reader sends the
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authentication key along with blood vessel to remote server. Biometrics reader also
forwards the time stamp and CIK to the remote server. The remote server verifies the
timestamp along with CIK and performs matching of the blood vessel map and the
authentication key by calculating the authentication key locally.

Figure 5: Protocol Description
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Chapter 4: Biometrics Theory
4.1 Overview
Biometrics is the science where the person is identified or verified using the
metrics of his biological characteristics. The biological characteristics are unique for
each person.

The biometrics is classified into two parts: static biometrics and

dynamic biometrics. The static biometrics are the things that (person is), such as
Fingerprint, IRIS, Retina, Face, and DNA. The dynamic biometrics are the things
that (person does), such as writing style, voice level and typing rhythm. The focus in
this thesis is only on the static biometrics of the individual for authenticating the
network parties to each others. The advantages of using bio-authentication are:
It is Unique for every individual and cannot be lost or stolen by another
individual.
It is difficult to transfer or copy the biometrics data.
Enhancing the security of the authentication.
Solving repudiation issues.
Provide both confidence and convenience of the user.
The bio-authentication has some disadvantages, such as:
Biometrics are static features which cannot be “reset” such as passwords.
The bio-data comparison is Matching Score not (Yes/No like passwords) due
to the nature of sensing technologies.
The privacy is big concern where not all of people accept.
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In This thesis, the focus only on two types of biometrics which are Fingerprint
minutiae data and Iris Image Data. They are explained based on ISO/IEC-19794
standard. The scope of this thesis is to use the digital stored data of biometrics in the
proposed

authentication

protocol.

The

mechanism

of

biometrics

sensing

technologies, features extraction and mathematics of analyzing are out of the scope.
The generation of the digital representation can be done by two methods: Featurebased method or Image-based method. Feature-based method extracts the important
features of the biometrics image and set them in systematic way. Image-based
method directly uses the image for matching without extraction any feature.

4.2 Fingerprint Minutiae Data
The fingerprint is the pattern of interleaved ridges and valleys on the tip of the
finger as shown in Figure-6. The method used to extract this type of biometrics is
feature-based method. The features of any fingerprint are mainly classified into two
main categories: Level-1 Features and Level-2 Features.

Figure 6: Valleys and Ridges in Fingerprint
Level-1 mainly focuses on finding the general behavior of the fingerprint in
terms of Singular Points. The singular points are places where the ridges orientations
changes abruptly. There are two types of singular points: core and delta s shown in
Figure-7. Core is a place where group of ridges comes and change their directions
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with the same angle. A delta is a place where three ridges are seems to meet. The
fingerprint usually has (0, 1 or 2) cores and (0, 1, or 2) deltas.

Figure 7: Singular Points in Fingerprint .(a) Core and (b) Delta
Level-2 features mainly focuses on defining the fingerprint minutiae locations in
the fingerprint image. The locations where (ridge or valley) ends, splits or merges
with another (ridge or valley) are termed as fingerprint minutiae. As shown in
Figures-(8, 9 and 10), there are three types of minutiae which are: Valley Skeleton
Bifurcation Point, Ridge Skeleton Bifurcation Point and Ridge Skeleton End Point.

Figure 8: Location and direcrion of ridge ending (encoded as valleys skeletion
bifurcation point)
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Figure 9: Location and direcrion of ridge bifurcation (encoded as ridge skeletion
bifurcation point)

Figure 10: Location and direcrion of ridge ending skeketion point
4.3 ISO/IEC 19794-2:2005 Finger Minutiae Record Format
This part represents the standard digital representation of fingerprint based on
features-based method. The record is organized into two parts:
General Header: Fixed length 14-bytes
Single Finger Record which consists of:

o 32-bytes header of single finger
o Series of (5 or 6) bytes minutiae descriptions.
o Extended data which may contains extra information about the
fingerprint, such as singular points.
The General Header
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The general header of Finger Minutia Record consists of several parts as shown
in Table-1.
Table 1: General Header Structure of Finger Minutiae Record
Name of
Field

Size

Format
Identifier

4 bytes

Version
of the
standard

4 bytes

Length
of total
record in
bytes
No. of
finger
views

Valid Values

Description

464D5200 Hex

ASCII (FMR) = Finger
Minutiae Record followed by
(00 Hex)

(„F‟ „M‟ „R‟ 00 Hex)
30333000 Hex
(„0‟ „3‟ „0‟ 00 Hex)

Standard Version = ASCII(030)
followed by (00 Hex)

4 bytes

24 Hex to FFFFFFFF Hex

Entire Length of Finger
Minutiae Data Record in bytes

2 bytes

0001 Hex to 00B0 Hex

1 to (10 fingers+1 unknown)
times 16 = 176

The Header of Single Finger
The length of each finger header is 32 bytes. The important parts only are
represented in the following Table-2. The whole explanation is given in Table-9
(appendix).
Table 2: Header of single finger structure
Name of
Field

Size

Valid Values

Description

Finger
position

1 bytes

0 to 10

Details in Table-3

5 or 6

Number of bytes required to
represent each minutia
(5 bytes in this thesis)

Minutiae
Field
Length

4 bits
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Ridge
Ending
Type

Determine the location of
ridge ending shall be recorded:
4 bits

0 or 1




Number of
Minutiae

1 bytes

Remaining
parts

29 bytes

Up to 256

0: Minutia indicated using
three valley bifurcations.
1: Minutia indicated using
ridge skeleton endpoints

Number of Minutiae extracted
and encoded for this
fingerprint
Details in Table-9 (Appendix)

Table 3: Code of finger position
Finger Position

Code

Unknown Finger

0

Right Thumb

1

Right Index Finger

2

Right Middle Finger

3

Right Ring Finger

4

Right Little Finger

5

Left Thumb

6

Left Index Finger

7

Left Middle Finger

8

Left Ring Finger

9

Left Little Finger

10

Series of 5 bytes minutiae descriptions (Metric Description)
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In this part, the minutiae are encoded and the structure of each minutia is shown
in Figure-11. The detailed description of finger minutia is explained in Table-4.

Figure 11: 5-byte finger minutia structure

Table 4: 5-byte finger minutia structure
Name of
Field

Size

Valid Values

Type

2 bits

0, 1 or 2
(3 reserved)

XCoordinate

14 bits

Up to 16384

Reserved

2 bits

Reserved and set to 0

For future use

YCoordinate

14 bits

Up to 16384

Indicates the Y-coordination of
the pixel contains the Minutia

Description
 0: Other Type
 1: Ridge Ending
 2: Ridge Bifurcation
Indicates the X-coordination of
the pixel contains the Minutia


Angle

8 bits

Up to 255



Represents the angle of
the minutia
Angle is recorded in unit
of 1.40625 (360/256)

4.4 Iris Image Data
The Iris is the part of the eye which centers the eye and surrounds the pupil and
controls its size. It is located behind the cornea and in front of the lens. The method
used to extract this type of biometrics is Image-based method. The Iris differs
between individuals in terms of size, color, round center, pupil size and other factors.
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4.5 ISO 19794-6:2011 Iris Image Data Record Format
This part represents the standard digital representation of Iris based on imagebased method. The record is organized into two parts:
General Header: Fixed length 16-bytes
Iris Image:

o Iris Representation Header : 53 bytes
o Image Representation Body: series of pixels (8 bits)

The General Header
The general header of Iris Image Record consists of several parts, as shown in
Table- 5
Table 5: Iris general header structure
Name of Field

Size

Format
Identifier

4 bytes

Version
Number

4 bytes

Length of
record

Valid Values

Description

49495200 Hex

IIR = Iris Image Record
followed by (00 Hex)

(„I‟ „I‟ „R‟ 00 Hex)
30323000 Hex
(„0‟ „2‟ „0‟ 00 Hex)

Standard Version =
ASCII(020) followed by
(00 Hex)

4 bytes

69 Hex to FFFFFFFF
Hex

Entire Length of Iris Image
Data in bytes

No. of Iris
Representations

2 bytes

1 to 65535

At least 1 representation
required

Certification
Flag

1 byte

00Hex

No certification flag for
ISO/IEC-19749
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Number of
Eyes
Represented

1 byte


0,1 or 2


1: if left or right eye is
known to be present.
2: if left and right eyes
are known to be
present.
0: if the laterality of the
eye image(s) is
unknown.

The Iris Representation Header
The length of Iris representation header is 53 bytes. The important parts only are
represented in the following Table-6. The whole explanation is given in Table- at
appendix.

Table 6: Structure of Iris image reprsentation header
Name of Field

Size

Valid Values

Eye Label

1 bytes

0,1 or 2

Description






Image Type

1 bits

1, 2, 3 or 7




Image Format

1 byte

Remaining
parts

29 bytes

2, 10, or 14




0: Undefined Eye
1: Right Eye
2: Left Eye
1: Un-cropped Iris
Image (see Figure-12)
2: VGA Iris Image
(see Figure-12)
3: Cropped Iris Image
(see Figure-13)
7: Cropped and
masked Iris Image
(see Figure-14)

2: MONO_RAW
10:
MONO_JPEG2000
 14: MONO_PNG
Details in Table-10
(appendix)
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Figure 12: Uncropped Iris image or VGA Iris image

Figure 13: Cropped Iris image

Figure 14: Cropped and masked Iris images

Image Representation body
This field contains the data of the captured Iris Image. Each pixel of uncompressed gray-scale is occupying 8 bits (256 gray levels). If the Image is
compressed, the pixel should be compressed using the same technique.

The

approximate record size of each type of Iris images is represented in Figure-15
(source: ISO-19794-6:2011).
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Figure 15: Image types and their approximate size
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Chapter 5: Proposed Biometrics-based Dynamic Authentication Protocol
5.1 Overview
The main objective of the proposed protocol is to authenticate session clients in a
continuous and dynamic manner using biometrics data. The protocol is compatible
with the TCP/IP protocols. It is important to mention that the biometrics data is
potentially large in size which can affect the performance of the communication.
Hence, only random part of the biometrics data will be embedded in the network
exchanged packets. This solution will introduce a unique combination between the
client‟s device IP address and the client‟s biometrics data. The proposed biometricbased IP protocol is called Bio-IP. Practically, the random biometrics portion is
embedded in the Option field of the IP header. Embedding the biometrics in the
Options field will ensure both scalability and compatibility. The system will be
compatible with any system since it is not proposing a new protocol that can be
dropped by secure routers or operating systems. The client‟s biometrics data is stored
in the server by the Server Administrator at an early stage.
The proposed solution uses a number of steps. The flow chart of the proposed
protocol is shown in Figure-16. After logging to the server using an ID and
password, the server dynamically (using random times) challenges the user to send a
random portion of his biometrics data for authentication. In case of wrong response,
the server will again challenge the client (e.g., two wrong trials are allowed). If the
user‟s responses to all challenge requests are wrong, then the server will shutdown
the session. Practically, once a response from the client is received, the server will
match the embedded biometrics data with the stored one. Since the biometrics
sensing technology will not give always an exact matching to the stored biometrics in
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the server, the matching algorithm used by the proposed protocol is not based on an
exact matching. In fact, it uses a score matching algorithm based on an accepted
threshold, which depends on some comparison approaches. Hamming distance is an
example of matching score algorithm (Li and Jain, 2009).

Server

Client
Login Process (User ID, Password)

Stored bio-template

Server Challenge request

Biometrics
Data

Challenge is embedded in Option field

Client provide his
bio-template

Client Response

Response bio-template

Response is embedded in Option field

Server database

2nd Server Challenge request

No

Yes

Matching
Score

Client provide his
bio-template

Client Response

Response bio-template
Stored bio-template

2nd Matching
Score

Yes

Session allowed to
continue

No
Server shut down the
session

Figure 16: Flow chart of the proposed protocol (1 wrong response trial is allowed)
5.4 Detailed Protocol Description
The proposed protocol uses 11 steps as shown in Figure-17. The first 3 steps are
for user login using user‟s ID and password. The remaining 8 steps are related to the
biometrics authentication process, during which the server attempts to issue
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challenge requests to the client for continuous and dynamic authentication. After
completing step-11, the server will send another challenge after random time to
ensure continuous and dynamic authentication during the session period. Using a
predefined random time interval, the server will keep sending challenge requests to
continuously and dynamically ensure client authentication during the whole session
period.

Client

Server
Step-1: I am Client
(IP S, IP D, User ID, Hash(Password))

Step-3: Accept or Reject Login
(IP S, IP D, Accept or Reject)

Step-2:
Verify the Login

After random time

Step-5 : Request Bio Template value
(IP S, IP D, Enc(Challenge), Hash(Challenge))

Step-4
Generate
Random biotemplate index

Step-6:
Verify the Server

Step-7:
Generate the BioTemplate value

Step-8 :Bio Template Value
(IP S, IP D, Enc(Response XOR Challenge), Hash(Response XOR Challenge))

Step-9:
Verify the Client

Step-11: Accept or Reject
(IP S, IP D, Accept or Reject)

Step-10:
Verify the biotemplate

Go to- Step-4
After random time

Figure 17: Detailed description of proposed protocol
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The detailed description of the protocol steps are discussed in detail as following:
Step-1
•

The user tries to login to the server using his user ID and Password

Step-2
•

The server verifies the login by comparing:
– User ID =? User ID
– Hash(Password) =? Hash (Password)

Step-3
•

The server notifies the user on the login attempt results.

Step-4
•

The server generates a random challenge (C) after random time

•

Server encrypts the challenge for confidentiality Enc(C)

•

Server hashes the challenge for integrity Hash (C)

•

Both encrypted and hashed challenge values are embedded in IP Option filed.

Step-5
•

The server sends a packets to the client <IPSOURCE,IPDESTINATION, Enc(C), Hash(C)>

Step-6
•

The user verifies the received data from server to ensure data integrity:
– Hash (Dec(Enc(C))=? Hash(C)

Step-7
•

The user generates the response (R) which contains the value of bio-template.

•

The user applies XOR operation for challenge and response (C XOR R)

•

User encrypts the XOR value for confidentiality Enc(C XOR R)

•

Server hashes the XOR value for integrity Hash(C XOR R)
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•

Both encrypted and hashed XOR values are embedded in IP Option filed.

Step-8
•

The client sends a packets to server <IPSOURCE,,IPDESTINATION , Enc(C XOR R),
Hash(C XOR R)>

Step-9
•

The server verifies the received data from user to ensure data integrity:
– Hash (Dec(Enc(C XOR R)) =? Hash(C XOR R)

Step-10
•

The server verifies the bio-template that extracted from the response.

•

A matching score algorithm is used for comparison (With accepted threshold)
.Different mechanisms can be applied for matching score, such as Hamming
Distance

Step-11
•

The server notifies the user if the login (Accept, Another trial or End the session).

•

Three trials are given to the client before server shuts down the session.

Step-12
In case of successful bio-authentication; after random time the server generates
another challenge to the user. It will go back to step-4 and complete rest of steps to
ensure dynamic authentication of the user.

5.3 IP header’s Options Field Structure
(Internet standards RFC 791, 1981) stated that the size of the Option field is
maximum equals to 40 bytes (10 words), while the proposed protocol requires only
36 bytes (9 words). The structure of the IP header is shown in Figure-18.
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Figure 18: Structure of IP header field
The proposed structure of the IP option field is divided into five parts as shown in
Figure-19.

Figure 19: Structure of proposed Option field
Option Type
The standard length of Option type in Options field is 1 byte (8 bits) as shown in
Figure-20.

Figure 20: Structure of option type
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Copy Flag is set to 1 if the Option is intended to be copied to all fragments if the
data is fragmented, and it is set to 0 if the option should not copied. In this protocol,
copy flag is set to 1 to avoid fragmentations problems.
Option class indicates four potential values that explain the general category into
Option which belongs. Two used values, 0 for control option and 2 for debugging
and measurements. The values (1 and 3) are reserved for future use. Option Number
specifies the kind of option among 32 potential values.
Option type can be equal to some values that are indications to do some
standard functions. Theses function and their corresponding values are shown in
Figure-21. In the proposed protocol, a different value is chosen as identification of
the proposed protocol for both server and client instead of creating a new protocol
number in the protocol field of IP header.

Figure 21: Available functions of Option Type (RFC 791)

30

Option Length
Option length indicates the full length of the IP header Option field in Bytes as
shown in Figure-22. Maximum value is 40 bytes which is (00101000). In the
proposed protocol, the length is 36 bytes which is (00100100).

Figure 22: Structure of option length field
Encrypted Challenge
This part contains the encryption of challenge or response. The length of this part
is 16 bytes (128 bits) as shown in Figure-23. Symmetric encryption with 128 bit
block is used. AES-128 is the recommended encryption algorithm.

Any AES

candidate algorithms, such as (Serpent, Twofish, RC6 or MARS) with 128 bit block
size can be used as alternative encryption algorithm.

Figure 23: Encryption of (challenge or resonse)
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Hashed Challenge
This part contains the hashed value of challenge or response. The length of this
part is 16 bytes (128 bits) as shown in Figure-24. MD5 is proposed algorithm since
its length is 128 bit. SHAKE-128 can be used as alternative hash algorithm.

Figure 24: Hash of (challenge or resonse)
Padding
The length of this part is two bytes. It is set to zero values. This part can be used
for any future enhancement of the proposed protocol.

5.4 Structure of challenge and response
The challenge and response field are structured according to the type of the
biometrics used (e.g. Fingerprint or IRIS).
Challenge Structure
The nature of the challenge, is requesting a portion of the client‟s biometrics data.
The challenge consists of other fields, such as the type of the requested biometrics
data (fingerprint or Iris), the User ID, and some detailed extracted from the standard
header of the requested biometrics data. The server sends only the start index of the
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requested biometrics portion. The challenge structure is divided into five parts as
shown in Figure- 25.

Figure 25: Challenge structure

Figure 26: ISO-19794-2:2005 finger position code

Figure 27: ISO-19794-6:2011 Eye label code
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The detailed description of biometrics challenge part is shown Table-7.

Table 7: Detailed structure of fingerprint minutiae and Iris image challenges
Index

Value

[0 : 15]

ID of user

Description
More than 65.5K possible
values
These values are depending on
ISO standard.

Bio Type
[16 : 47]





0x464D5200 - Fingerprint
0x49495200 – Iris
Others – Reserved

It Consists of four ASCII
Letters


Fingerprint Minutiae
Record: 464D5200Hex
(„F‟ „M‟ „R‟ 00Hex )
 Iris Image Record :
49495200Hex
(„I‟ „I‟ „R‟ 00Hex )

If fingerprint bio-type:


[48 : 55]

0x00-0x0A – Finger position
(Figure-26)
 Others – Reserved
If Iris bio-type:


0x00,0x01,0x02 – Eye label
(Figure-27)
 Others – Reserved
If others:
 Reserved
If fingerprint bio-type:
 Padding (All zeros)
If Iris bio-type:
[56: 63]

 0x01,0x02,0x07,0x07
If others:


[64:95]

These values are depending on
ISO standard.
It represents:( which finger of
the user, or which eye) is
requested for authentication

These values are depending on
ISO standard.
It is used to describe the image
type of Iris.

Reserved

Bio-Header specification padding
(All zeros)

It can be used for future
enhancement of the protocol
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[96:115]

[116:127]

Index of asked template of bio-data
(The start position of the requested
biometrics portion)
Padding (All zeros).

More than 1.04 Millions
possible values
It can be used for future
enhancement of the protocol

The detailed structure of the standard parts of fingerprint minutia challenge is
shown in Figure-28.

Figure 28: Detailed structure of the proposed fingerprint minutiae challenge and its
standard parts

The detailed structure of the standard parts of Iris image challenge is shown in
Figure-29.
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Figure 29: Detailed structure of the proposed Iris image challenge and its standard
parts

Response Structure
The nature of response is sending the required portion of biometrics data of
fingerprint minutiae or Iris pixels. The response value is called the biometrics
template as shown in Figure-30.

Figure 30: General structure of the proposed response
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For the fingerprint, the template value is consists of:
Three Sequenced fingerprint minutiae values ( 5 bytes each) starting from the
requested index
Number of cores in the fingerprint (4 bits)
Number of deltas in the fingerprint) (4 bits).

Figure 31: General structure of the proposed fingerprint minutiae response

Figure 32: Detailed structure of the proposed fingerprint minutiae response
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For the IRIS; the template value is consists of:
Sequence of 15 Iris pixels values (8 bits each) starting from the requested index

Figure 33: General structure of the proposed Iris image response

Figure 34: Detailed structure of the proposed Iris image response

The proposed protocol states that if the requested template or any field of the
challenge is out of range, the response sets the corresponding field to zero
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Chapter 6: Simulation and Results
6.1 Simulation Overview
This simulation is implemented in MatLab environment. Databases are structured
in simple comma delimited CSV files but contain all the necessary information to
prove and show the feasibility of IP layer biometric authentication.

User

MatLab

Simulation
Code
Blocks

Graphical User
Interface

Client
Biometric
Database

Server
Biometric
Database

Figure 35: Simulation overview

Figure -35 shows the simulation overview. The user runs the simulation code
blocks using the Matlab console as shown in Figure-36. The simulation code blocks
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instantiates the graphical user interface as shown in Figure-37, where the user can
provide the login information and continues with the simulation by pressing the
LOGIN push button. The simulation code blocks reads and parses the client and
server databases. The CSV database file is shown in Figure-38. While the simulation
is running, output messages are fed back to the graphical user interface as well as a
more detailed one in the MatLab command line interface. Simulation variables can
also be observed on the MatLab base workspace as all simulation code blocks reads
and updates these variables throughout the simulation. The user can do again the
biometric part of the authentication protocol by pressing RAND AUTH push button.
In the simulation, the client is allowed to provide the asked bio-template only three
times, otherwise, the simulation terminates. The bio-template is accepted or not
based on their matching score. The matching score is calculated using Hamming
distance algorithm.

Figure 36: Matlab console
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Figure 37: Graphical User Interface of the simulation
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Figure 38: CSV file which represents the database structure
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6.2 Simulation Flow
init

clientlogin

clientdb

client.csv

server_auths_client

serverdb

server.csv

md5
server_challenge
encrypt

aes

md5

client_response

decrypt

aes

encrypt

aes

md5
server_response
decrypt

aes

Figure 39: Simulation Flow

Figure-39 shows the simulation flow and the major code blocks. The code
blocks are called in a chained manner similar to the sequential events of biometricsbased dynamic authentication for secure services.
The simulation starts by calling the init function. Init initializes the simulation.
Then, it calls the clientlogin function. Clientlogin function creates the graphical
interface. When the user clicks the login push button, all the text box information is
extracted by clientlogin function and are compared with the local client database. It
verifies login information to the server database by calling server_auths_client
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function. If everything matches in the server database, then it calls the
server_challenge function to start biometric part of the authentication protocol. In
server_challenge, the server generates a challenge packet which contains the type of
biometric information asked (Iris or fingerprint), and the asked index.
Server_challenge also calculates the MD5 checksum, encrypt the packet, and send it
over to client. This is done by calling the client_response function. In client response
function the encrypted server challenge is decrypted, then the hash is calculated and
compared with the received hash. If the two hashes matches, this means that the
server challenge packet is not modified and valid. After this, the client pulls out the
biometric template of index and type asked by the server. The client applies an XOR
operation of both challenge and response. Then,

the client respond with the

encrypted XOR value together with its corresponding MD5 hash. Calling
server_response function corresponds to the receiving the client response packet and
MD5 hash. The server decrypts this, calculate the hash, and compare the calculated
hash to the received hash. Then the server sends a result message to the client ending
the IP layer biometric authentication protocol.

6.3 Code Blocks

Block-1: Client Login
The function of this code block is summarized as follows:
Contains the functions that creates the graphical interface
Defines the login pushbutton call back function
Initialize all the client variables
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Get the user input from the graphical user interface (user ID, password, IP address)
Generates the user login packet from the user input
Loads the local client database by calling clientdb function
Cross checks the local client database if the login ID and password are correct
If the login information does not exist in the local database, then
Calls the server_auths_client function to validate the login information
Calls the server_challenge function to begin bio authentication protocol

clientdb
server_auths_client
server_challenge

Login Pushbutton Object
Create
Function
Object 1
Matlab
GUI
Related
Functions

Object 1
Create
Object 1
Edit Box 1 Object Function
Create
Create
Function
Create
Function
Function

Callback
Function

Callback
Function
Callback
Callback
Function
Callback
Function
Function

Figure 40: Clientlogin structure
Clientlogin contains the main MatLab functions for the graphical user interface.
It has the definition of create and callback functions of the objects in the graphical
interface, such as the push buttons, edit text boxes, and static text boxes. The create
function of the objects sets its properties at the time the object is instantiated. The
callback function is executed when an event happened to the object, such as a mouse
click. In particular, the login push button callback function as shown on Figure-40
calls the major code blocks to simulate the dynamic authentication protocol.
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Convert user info to proper
Update MatLab base workspace
format

Update MatLab
clientdb
base workspace

Search theclientdb
server database

Search the server database

Login info
matched?

No
Display login error message

Yes
server_auths_client

Login info
matched?

No
Display login error message

Yes
server_challenge

Update graphical user interface

Figure 41: Clientlogin Flow
As shown on Figure-41, the clientlogin flow started by converting to proper
format the user input from the graphical user interface. Then, it updates the base
MatLab workspace and calls clientdb function to load the client database. Once
loaded, it then searches the login information in the database. If there‟s no match,
then it displays a login error message. If there is a match, then it calls the
server_auths_client function to validate the login information against the server
database. If there‟s a match in the server side validation, then it calls the
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server_challenge function to begin the next part of the biometric dynamic
authentication simulation. After executing the server_challenge function, it updates
the graphical user interface.
Block-2: server_auths_client
The function of this code block is summarized as follows:
Loads the server data by calling serverdb function
Validates the login ID and password based on the contents of the server database
If login information is not valid, it send message to client and terminates the
authentication protocol.

Get the login packet

serverdb

Search the server database

Update MatLab base workspace

Figure 42: Server_auths_client flow
As shown on Figure-42, the server_auths_client function starts by getting the
login information from the MatLab base workspace. Then, it loads the server
database by calling serverdb function. Once loaded, it then searches the login
information in the database. If there‟s no match, then it displays a login error
message. Finally, the MatLab base workspace is updated whatever the result of the
search is.
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Block-3: server_challenge
The function of this code block is shown in Figure-43 and summarized as
follows:
Randomize the selection of challenge whether Iris or fingerprint
Generate a random index that will be asked from the client
Generate the server challenge packet
Calculate the MD5 hash of the server challenge packet
Encrypt the server challenge using a pre-shared key
Send the encrypted server challenge and the calculated MD5 hash
Call the client_response function

Initialize local variables

Random select biotemplate type

Generate the server challenge

Calculate MD5 hash of server
challenge

Encrypt the server challenge

Update MatLab base workspace

client_response

Figure 43: Server_challenge flow
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Server challenge function first initializes its local variables by loading the values
from the MatLab base workspace. It randomly selects the type of bio-template using
a random number generator. The type can be an Iris or a fingerprint bio-template.
Then, it generates the random challenge. Inside the random challenge is the asked
index. The asked index is the index of the bio-template that the client should send
back in its response. After the server challenge packet has been formed, its MD5 has
is calculated and then encrypted using AES algorithm. These values are then
uploaded to the MatLab base workspace.
Block-4: client_response
The function of this code block is shown in Figure-44 and summarized as
follows:
Receives the encrypted server challenge and its MD5 hash
Decrypts the server challenge
Calculates the MD5 hash of the decrypted server challenge
Compares the received server challenge hash with the calculated hash of decrypted server
challenge

If hashes don‟t match, it terminates the bio authentication protocol
Generates the client response bio-template
XOR the response with the received challenge (response XOR challenge)
Calculates the MD5 hash of the (response XOR challenge)
Encrypts the (response XOR challenge)
Calls the server_response function
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Initialize local variables

Decrypt the server challenge

Calculate MD5 hash of
decrypted server challenge

Hashes
matched?

No
Display login error message

Yes
Load parsed client database
from Matlab base workspace

Send error message to client

Update MatLab base workspace
Get the asked biotemplate

Generate the client response

Calculate MD5 hash of client
response

Encrypt the client response

Update MatLab base workspace

Figure 44: Client_response flow
Client_response function first initializes its local variables by loading the values
from the MatLab base workspace. Then it decrypts the server challenge. After
decryption, it then calculates the MD5 hash. The calculated hash is compared to the
hash in the server challenge. If the hashes do not match, then either the encrypted
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message or the sent hash has been modified. In this case, it will display a login error
message, send error message to the server, then update the MatLab base workspace
for the result. Otherwise (hashes matched), it will continue and load the parsed client
database in the MatLab base workspace. Then the asked bio-template is extracted to
form the client response packet. An XOR operation is applied between server
challenge and client response. The MD5 hash of the XOR operation packet is
calculated. XOR value packet is encrypted and then the MatLab base workspace is
updated.

Block-5: server_response
The function of this code block is shown in Figure-45 and summarized as
follows:
Receives the encrypted client (response XOR challenge) and its MD5 hash
Decrypts the client (response XOR challenge)
Calculate the MD5 hash of the decrypted client (response XOR challenge)
Compare the calculated hash of the decrypted (response XOR challenge) and the
received hash
Terminate the authentication protocol if the hashes don‟t match.
Fetch the bio-template of the asked template from server database
Calculate the Hamming distance of the received client response bio-template and
the bio-template from the server database
Decides whether to accept or reject the client based on the matching score
threshold
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Initialize local variables

Decrypt the client response

Calculate MD5 hash of
decrypted client response

Hashes
matched?

No
Display login error message
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Send error message to client

Load parsed server database
from Matlab base workspace

Update MatLab base workspace
Get the asked biotemplate

Calculate the matching score

Matching core greater
than threshhold?

No
Display login error message

Yes
Send error message to client
Generate the server response

Update MatLab base workspace
Update MatLab base workspace

Figure 45: Server_response flow
Server_response function first initializes its local variables by loading the values
from the MatLab base workspace. Then it decrypts the client response. After
decryption, it then calculates the MD5 hash. The calculated hash is compared to the
hash in the client response. If the hashes do not match, then either the encrypted
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message or the sent hash has been modified. In this case, it will display a login error
message, send error message to the client, then update the MatLab base workspace
for the result. Otherwise (hashes matched), it will continue and load the parsed server
database in the MatLab base workspace. Then the asked bio-template is extracted
and the matching score is calculated between the received bio-template in the client
response and the entry in the server database. If the matching score is less than the
threshold, it will display a login error message, send error message to the client, then
update the MatLab base workspace for the result. Otherwise, it will proceed and
generate a successful login server response to the client, then update the MatLab base
workspace for the result.
Block-6: encrypt, decrypt
The function of this code block is shown in Figure-46 and summarized as
follows:
Initializes the AES code
Converts the input to proper format for the AES code
Calls the AES code
Clear all the AES variables

Initialize S-boxes and polynomial
matrices

Format the data for AES

AES

Reformat the data for output

Clear all AES variables

Figure 46: Encrypt and decrypt flow
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Encrypt and decrypt functions are the wrapper function of the AES block. These
functions start by initializing the S-boxes and polynomial matrices. The input data
for AES is formatted and converted from hexadecimal to decimal. After, it is fed to
the AES block. The output of the AES block is reformatted back from decimal to
hexadecimal and then returns the value to the calling function. All variables used in
the calculation are then cleared.
Block-7: serverdb, clientdb
The function of this code block is shown in Figure-47 and summarized as
follows:
SERVERDB loads serverdb.csv
CLIENTDB loads clientdb.csv
Parses the contents of the csv file
Puts the variables on the global Matlab workspace
Clears all used variables

Initialize local variables

Open file database

Read one line

Is a string or char?

No

Update MatLab base workspace

Yes
Close file database
Split line

Clear all local variables
Update local variables
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Figure 47: ServerDB and ClientDB flow
ServerDB and ClientDB are utility code blocks used to load the comma
delimited CSV files. These files are the databases used in the simulation. ServerDB
and ClientDB open its corresponding file and read it line by line until it encounters a
non-string or non-character line. It interprets this as the end of file or end of the
database. In each line, values are separated by a comma. The line string is split into
an array with size based on the number of comma delimiters. The local variables are
updated in every line parsed. When it encounters the end of the database, the loop
breaks and then the MatLab base workspace is updated with the parsed values.
ServerDB and ClientDB are almost identical except for the CSV files they are
parsing. ServerDB parses serverdb.csv while ClientDB parses clientdb.csv.

Block-8: AES
Advance Encryption Algorithm 128 is based substitution –permutation network
design principle as shown in Figure-48. It operates on a 4x4 column-major order
matrix of bytes referred to as state. The round keys are derived from the cipher key
using Rijndael‟s key schedule. In the initial round, each byte of the state is combined
with a block of the round key using bitwise xor. In the rounds prior to the final
round, the state undergoes a non-linear substitution step where each byte is replaced
with another according to a lookup Table (SubBytes). Then a transposition step
where the last three rows of the state are shifted cyclically a certain number of steps
(ShiftRows). And then it goes through a mixing operation which operates on the
columns of the state, combining the four bytes in each column (MixColumns). The
final round is similar to the previous round except there is no MixColumns. (Stalling,
2003) (Kumar and Tiwari, 2012).
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Figure 48: AES algorithm

Block-9: MD5
This code block calculates the MD5 hash as shown in Figure-49. After
initialization, it makes sure that all inputs are ASCII characters. Then, the message is
padded to make its length divisible by 512. The padded message is converted into
32-bit integer in little endian format. The 512-bit block is then processed using the
MD5 algorithm (Stalling, 2003). The result is then converted back to hexadecimal
format. The result is then returned to the calling function.
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Initialize row vectors

Convert the all input characters
to ASCII

Pad the input

Convert the input to 32-bit
integer, little endian

Append bit length

Process the 512-bit block

Convert hash to hexadecimal

Figure 49: MD5 flow
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6.4 Simulation Results

Figure 50: Simulation results
A result in one of the simulations is shown in Figure-50. The client fill up the
login information edit boxes and clicks LOGIN push button. At the client, the login
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information is verified onto the local client database and check if the user id exists
and the corresponding password is correct. The login information is also verified on
the server side. If the login is successful, a message is sent to the client. The server
then generates a challenge to the client. The client responds by sending the asked
bio-template to the server. The server verifies the client response by comparing it
with the server database using Hamming distance. The comparison generates a
matching score. If the matching score is more then 95%, then the client is
successfully authenticated as shown in the Figure above. In addition, the client can
regenerate its response (this is similar to scanning your finger print or Iris again) and
resend it by clicking Rand.Auth. Push button. However, the client can only resend its
response only three times. Otherwise, the authentication completely fails. A timer is
also added to measure the duration of each simulation.

Runtime (s)

Runtime vs. Database Size
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1.916
1.914
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1.908
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5

100

200
300
Database Size (Entries)

400

500

Figure 51: Runtime vs. Database size (in bytes)
The comparison of runtime versus increasing size of database is done as shown
in Figure-51. As the number of entries in the database increases, the runtime also
increases. This corresponds to the time it takes to search for the user and extract the
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associated bio-template information. Although the type of database might affect the
performance, the runtime trend will stay in a similar increasing pattern since all the
other calculation in the authentication protocol, such as the AES and MD5
calculation remains the same.
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Chapter 7: Security Validation of Proposed Protocol
7.1 Scyther Tool Briefing
Designer of any protocol should ensure that the protocol achieves the
requirements of performance, scalability and security. The performance and
scalability analysis was done using Matlab simulation. In this part; the security of the
proposed protocol is validated using Scyther tool. Scyther is a tool used for the
formal analysis of security protocols against the known attacks, such as replay,
masquerade, modification and unauthorized access. The tool is assuming that, any
cryptographic function is perfect and the adversary cannot decrypt the massage
unless he knows the secret key. Scyther tool is used to find problems that are related
to the nature of the protocol design which can help the designer to validate his
protocol. The tool is compatible with both MAC and windows operating systems.
Scyther tool is coded using Secure Protocol Description Language (SPDL). The
purpose of this language is to describe the security properties of the protocol
(Cremers and Mauw, 2012).
Validating the security of the transferred challenge and response is the focal
point in identifying the security of the proposed protocol. The proposed protocol has
two agents (parties) which are: client and server. The protocol is consists of set of
roles as shown in Figure-52. The roles also is consists of sequence of events. The
events are either sent, received or match items between the two parties as shown in
Figure-53. The scythe language also consists of certain atomic items, such as freshly
generated values, variables, symmetric key, asymmetric keys and hash functions
(Scyther manual).
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Figure 52: Protocol minimum requirement (2 roles)

Figure 53: Atomic items and events
Scyther tool is designed to measure the Secrecy and Authentication of the
evaluated protocol. The evaluation functions are done by Claims functions. Claims
functions are used to model any intended security property as shown in Figure-54.
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Figure 54: Set of possible security claims functions

According to (Cremers and Mauw, 2012) Secrecy expresses that certain
information is not revealed to an adversary, even though this data is communicated
over an un-trusted network. In Scyther tool the evaluation of secrecy depends on two
security properties:
Secret: It ensures that each event achieve Secrecy.
SKR: It ensure that each event achieve Secrecy but using a Secret Key.
(Lowe, 1997) said that: “the appropriate authentication requirement will depend
upon the use to which the protocol is put, and identify several possible definitions of
“authentication”. The authentications definitions are considering a protocol that aims
to authenticate a responder B (Receiver) to an Initiator A (Sender). The following
forms are defined:
(Aliveness): “The protocol guarantees to an initiator A aliveness of another agent
B if, whenever A (acting as initiator) completes a run of the protocol, apparently
with responder B, then B has previously been running the protocol “ (Lowe,
1997).

64

(Weak agreement): “The protocol guarantees to an initiator A weak agreement
with another agent B if, whenever A (acting as initiator) completes a run of the
protocol, apparently with responder B, then B has previously been running the
protocol, apparently with A (Lowe, 1997 ).
(Non-injective agreement). “The protocol guarantees to an initiator A noninjective agreement with a responder B on a set of data items ds (where ds is a set
of free variables appearing in the protocol description) if, whenever A (acting as
initiator) completes a run of the protocol, apparently with responder B, then B
has previously been running the protocol, apparently with A, and B was acting as
responder in his run, and the two agents agreed on the data values corresponding
to all the variables in ds” (Lowe, 1997).
(Non-injective synchronization) This property requires that there exists a cast
function such that for all claim run events whose intended partners are honest,
certain events occur in the trace (Cremers and Mauw, 2012).
(Agreement over data) It shows that the role I agrees with the role R on a set of
terms. It is done in Scyther by using the word Commit (Cremers and Mauw,
2012).

7.2 The Security Validation
The proposed authentication protocol is validated using scythe tool. Two roles
are created: Client and Server, The challenge and response packets are evaluated in
order to ensure all levels of secrecy and authentication are met. Figure-55 presents
the written scythe code and Figure-56 presents the validation of all security
properties which proofs that the all security requirements are met.
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Figure 55: Scyther written code of the proposed protocol
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Figure 56: Security properties validation of the proposed protocol
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Chapter 8: Conclusion

This thesis discusses a novel secure protocol for continuous and dynamic
authentication of session‟s users using biometrics data. It proposes a biometricsbased secure authentication protocol against physical session hijacking attacks. The
authentication process is based on user‟s biometrics, mainly fingerprint and Iris. The
standard digital representations in the databases of single fingerprint data and Iris
image are discussed in detail. The required biometrics portion for authentication is
embedded in the IP header‟s Option field to ensure compatibility with different
TCP/IP protocols implementation. The security of the proposed protocol is validated
using Scyther tool in terms of authenticity and secrecy. The proposed protocol is
simulated using Matlab tool. The simulation shows that the proposed protocol
requires larger run time than the ordinary login/password scheme, but it is acceptable
due to the security requirements achieved.
In future work, this protocol can be modified to include other types of biometrics.
The attacks against the proposed attacks will be investigated. Also, common service
authentication based on the proposed protocol will be implemented and evaluated,
such as HTTP, FTP or Telnet.
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Appendix
The header of single finger record

Table 8: Detailed structure of single finger record header
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Iris Representation Header

Table 9: Detailed structure of Iris representation header
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